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Numerous reform initiatives have attempted to improve the
acquisition process. The success or failure of these
initiatives have often been based on subjective
determinations. In order to determine the true effect of
these initiatives we must be able to measure the effect of
these initiatives on the acquisition process. Measurement
requires the development of metrics . This study explores the
use of metrics for acquisition reform, using the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) , Public Law 101-
510, as a case study.
This study identifies the objectives of DAWIA. Using the
Policy Effectiveness Model, the study develops and proposes
metrics for DAWIA objectives in an effort to measure the
implementation and effectiveness of this important and far-
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The purpose of this research is to explore how the
effects of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) of 1990 can be measured.
B . BACKGROUND
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act is the
public law enacted in 1990 that prescribes how the acquisition
workforce will be managed. The objective of DAWIA is to
develop a dedicated pool of highly qualified military and
civilian acquisition specialists to fill designated critical
acquisition positions in order to create a more efficient and
effective procurement system for the Government. DAWIA covers
acquisition corps membership requirements, contracting officer
requirements, PM qualification standards, requirements for
assignment to critical acquisition positions, and waiver
requirements
.
To date, a great deal of time, effort, and money have
been spent on implementing the requirements of DAWIA.
However, there is little information available indicating how
the acquisition process has benefitted as a result of that
time, effort, and money. This research explores ways to
determine those benefits. Specifically it looks at ways to
determine DAWIA' s impact on the acquisition process and
introduces metrics as measures of effectiveness.
Measurement often leads to controversy and argument
.
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What are appropriate metrics for the process and the product?
How should the data be collected and used? Is it fair to use
measurements to compare people, processes, or products? These
questions and dozens of others always surface when an attempt
is made to measure something that has not been measured in the
past. Such is the case with measuring the effect of DAWIA.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
How can the effectiveness of DAWIA be measured?
Subsidiary research questions are:
1. What are the objectives of DAWIA?
2
.
What is a metric and what types of metrics are suitable
for acquisition?
3 What metrics are currently being used to measure the
effects of DAWIA on the acquisition process?
4 Are these appropriate metrics?
5 Are there standardized metrics for acquisition reform
initiatives? If not, should standards be established?
D SCOPE
This thesis describes DAWIA, a history of acquisition
reform and the events that led to DAWIA; discusses the use of
metrics to measure people, processes, and products; determines




The first objective of this research is to provide an
overview of acquisition reform, DAWIA, and metrics. This is
accomplished through a literature review of sources including:
- References, publications and electronic media available
at the Naval Postgraduate School Library
- Internet websites and homepages (DoD, commercial, and
academic)
- Published academic research papers
- Unclassified Department of Defense publications
The second objective is to analyze DAWIA and determine
suitable metrics for measuring the effectiveness of DAWIA.
The analysis will be accomplished using the Policy
Effectiveness Model [Ref . 1; p. 33 0] . The primary sources of
this information are DoD reports, acquisition literature, and
interviews with faculty and officials from Defense Acquisition
University, Defense Systems Management College, and the Naval
Postgraduate School; acquisition reform office personnel; and
acquisition workforce personnel.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II (Background) provides a history of acquisition
reform and describes the events that led to enactment of
DAWIA. It also provides a description of DAWIA requirements
and objectives.
Chapter III (Metrics) introduces metrics, providing
definition, purpose, and benefits. The chapter describes a
methodology for establishing metrics in an organization. The
chapter then examines the use of metrics in various fields-
-
software, education, and DoD acquisition reform.
Chapter IV (Analysis of DAWIA Metrics) provides an
analysis of the metrics used for DAWIA and an analysis of
DAWIA objectives. The chapter then tailors metrics to DAWIA
requirements
.
Chapter V (Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations)
summarizes the findings of the research, answers the research
questions, and presents recommendations for further research
and study.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This study explores ways to determine the effectiveness
of DAWIA through the use of metrics. This information
provides valuable feedback to acquisition leaders that will
enable them to develop measures and techniques for determining
the effectiveness of acquisition reform initiatives. The use
of measures allows acquisition leaders to assess DAWIA and
possibly other reform initiatives in order to direct future
efforts and give them opportunity to provide maximum benefit
to the acquisition process.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a history of acquisition reform and
describes the events that led to the enactment of DAWIA. It
also provides a description of DAWIA requirements and closes
with a chapter summary.
B. HISTORY OF ACQUISITION REFORM
The federal acquisition system is undoubtedly one of the
most thoroughly developed, documented, examined, and
scrutinized, acquisition systems in existence [Ref . 2: p. 2] .
The federal acquisition system has long suffered from negative
perceptions. Innumerable articles and reports have been
generated discussing the ineffectiveness of our acquisition
system. Reports of the huge cost overruns involving the
purchases of weapons, vehicles, hammers, etc. have filled the
newspapers for decades
.
As a result, there have been numerous attempts to improve
the acquisition process through various reform initiatives.
These reform initiatives began with the large procurement of
weapons in World War II and are likely to continue as long as
the government remains in the procurement business.
Weapons production in the United States has been big
business since World War II. President Roosevelt, recognizing
the need to mobilize the nation's industrial might, sought to
centralize weapons procurement when he appointed Donald Nelson
as the War Production board Chairman. Nelson's mission was
to oversee the military department's development and purchase
of war equipment. Nelson, however, failed to carry through
with Roosevelt's intent of centralizing procurement. He
elected to defer to the departments, believing his decisions
would undermine their process with unnecessary civilian
oversight. Nelson's hands-off approach likely resulted from
his predecessor, Bernard Baruch, who upon being appointed




The current acquisition management system began to
develop in the Eisenhower administration. After World War II,
there was rapid development of technology and a tremendous
increase of worldwide American national security commitments.
As a result, traditional roles of the services were split,
creating interservice rivalry over weapon system development
responsibility. President Eisenhower's answer to interservice
rivalry and the resulting competition for resources was the
creation of a centralized civilian authority in the relatively
new Department of Defense. [Ref. 3: p. 2]
Eisenhower's proposal sought to establish a single
uniformed service and to restructure the component branches
along functional lines. However, because it ran contrary to
the prerogatives of the uniformed services and perhaps
Congress, this proposal was not adopted. [Ref. 3: p. 2]
Afterwards, Eisenhower's 1958 Defense Reorganization Act
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realigned the U.S. defense structure, but unfortunately-
separated the administrative functions from the responsibility-
structure. This separation further complicated an already
complex bureaucracy. [Ref . 3: p. 3]
During this era, contracting was dominated by cost-plus
contracts in an effort to push technology forward rapidly and
gain on the Soviets. However, in the 1960's the use of cost-
plus contracts fell into disrepute as huge overruns occurred.
In 1961, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert McNamara
sought to reform the acquisition process by instituting a
business school approach to analyzing the needs of the
nation's defense. McNamara wanted to incorporate more control
into the acquisition process and he wanted the process to
provide all of the information leaders needed in order to make
decisions. He brought in Charles Hitch from the RAND
Corporation to develop a systematic process for establishing
requirements and incorporating them into a five-year budget.
Hitch developed this process which later became known as the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).[Ref. 3: p.
3]
McNamara s attempts to improve poor management through
innovations in program planning, source selection,
contracting, and program management failed to achieve expected
results. His Total Package Procurement (TPP) , essentially a
fixed-price contract for Research and Development (R&D) and
initial procurement, failed to achieve expected results. TPP
programs such as the C-5A, F-111A, and the F-14 failed to
constrain cost, eventually had to be rewritten, and brought
unfavorable nationwide attention. [Ref . 3: p. 4] As a result,
fixed-price contracts fell into disuse on major systems until
the 1980s.
During the Nixon and Ford administrations, Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird returned some of the services' autonomy,
but retained some central control through a new senior level
board called the Defense Systems Advisory Review Council
(DSARC) . The DSARC and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG) provided the SECDEF more oversight over weapons
acquisitions. Other attempts at improvements were short-lived
or they were implemented superficially and for the most part
were considered unsuccessful. [Ref. 3: p. 4]
The cycle of change continued with the next
administration when Harold Brown, SECDEF in the Carter
administration, sought to regain some of the authority in
weapons acquisition relinquished previously. He issued a
requirement for the services to comply with Circular A-109, an
directive published by the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy in 1976. Circular A-109 required the services to
prepare a mission area analysis and document their weapons
need in a mission needs statement. [Ref. 3: p. 4]
Change in the acquisition process continued with the next
administration. In 1981, Caspar Weinberger, the SECDEF in the
Reagan administration, implemented a change that reversed the
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trend towards centralization. Weinberger gave more authority
to subordinate line executives, especially program managers,
to execute OSD policy. [Ref . 3: p. 4]
Twenty years after McNamara, the acquisition process was
more structured and complex. In 1981, Frank Carlucci,
Weinberger's Deputy Secretary of Defense, directed the
services to implement 32 initiatives to reform the acquisition
process. These initiatives aimed to streamline the
acquisition process, reprogram costs, and shorten acquisition
time. The underlying principle of the Carlucci initiatives
was that over-regulation undermined efficiency. The services
started many of his initiatives, but success was short-lived
due to three factors; 1) a Congress reluctant to relinquish
some of its purse-string powers, 2) services reluctant to
change some of their practices, and 3) Carlucci 's departure
due to a new administration. [Ref. 3: p. 4]
Until the mid-eighties most reform recommendations
addressed DoD's acquisition organization or process. In 1986,
Reagan's Presidential Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Management,
also known as the Packard Commission, continued with this
trend. Procurement spending doubled between 1980 and 1985,
resulting in increased attention on defense acquisition and
further examination of the process. The Commission, after
examining the process, concluded that the defense acquisition
process was not being operated and managed effectively, and
was negatively affecting cost and efficiency of
procurement . [Re f . 3: p. 5]
As a result of the Commission's findings, Congress passed
the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Although it recommended
sweeping changes, some requiring Congressional action, the act
failed to implement major recommendations. Consequently,
President Bush directed a 1989 study. This study, called the
Defense Management Review, led to extensive changes to the DoD
acquisition organization. It streamlined the acquisition
chain-of -command from the Defense Acquisition Executive
through a newly created Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)
.
The chain-of -command continued from the SAE to the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) and to the program manager (PM) . [Ref
3: p. 5]
Through the years in addition to executive level
scrutiny, Congress has taken an increased degree of interest
in DoD acquisition efforts. Especially since 1970, Congress
has accelerated legislation, enacting implementing regulations
that further adds to the government bureaucracy and further
complicates the acquisition process. [Ref. 3: p. 6]
For example, a goal of Congress in the 1970s and 1980s
was to implement full and open competition in defense
acquisition. Several laws within the last two decades
underscore the importance of achieving that goal . These
actions include: The 1978 Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products Program, the 1984 Competition in
Contracting Act, and the 1989 Congressional Direction to
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Streamline Regulations Governing Commercial Products
.
[Re f . 4:
p. 20]
Congressional involvement continued as a result of the
111 Winds procurement scandal in the 1980s. The chairmen of
the Armed Services Committees joined three former defense
secretaries and industry executives to review the DoD
acquisition system and concluded little improvement had been
made over the years. The major product of their study was the
introduction of several bills that all proposed centralizing
acquisition through the establishment of an integrated
acquisition system that would oversee procurement of all the
services. [Ref . 3: p. 7]
One of the proposed bills was the creation of an
acquisition corps in 1990. Representative Nicholas Mavroules
(D, Massachusetts) , Chairman of the House Armed Services
Investigation Subcommittee, introduced the bill that was
ultimately passed as the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) . This bill, the object of this study,
directed DoD to create a professional acquisition corps in
each of the services. [Ref. 3: p. 7]
The history of acquisition reform reveals many attempts
to improve the process. Improvement efforts have been marked
by hearings, executive commissions, legislative commissions,
boards, and interagency task reviews [Ref. 2: p. 2] . Many of
these efforts often reversed previous changes to the process,
resulting in a cyclical affect of change to the system. DAWIA
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is a law that resulted from these efforts to improve the
acquisition system. Next, we will look further into the
events that led to DAWIA.
C. EVENTS LEADING TO DAWIA
1. The Packard Commission
The Packard Commission study is likely one of the most
influential events that brought about the creation of DAWIA.
The major task of the Commission was to evaluate the defense
acquisition system, to determine how it might be improved, and
to recommend changes that could lead to the acquisition of
military equipment with equal or greater performance but at
lower cost and with less delay. [Ref . 5: p. 4]
The Packard Commission concluded in their report that the
defense acquisition system has basic problems that must be
corrected. The report states:
These problems result from an increasingly
bureaucratic and over regulated process. As a
result, all too many of our weapon systems cost too
much, take too long to develop, and by the time
they are fielded, incorporate obsolete
technology. [Ref. 5: p. 5]
The Commission discovered that the problems seldom result
from fraud or dishonesty. The problems were symptomatic of
other underlying problems affecting the entire acquisition
system. These problems are [Ref. 5: p. 6]
:
1) Goldplating - the inclusion of system features that
are desired but not necessary, resulting in costs that far
exceed the system's real value. Goldplating results from
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"user pull" and "technology push." User pull occurs when users
specify military needs. Frequently, these users have no
knowledge of the cost and schedule implications for satisfying
those needs and thus lack any incentive to compromise.
Technology push occurs when government or industry conceive of
new or advanced technologies and persuade users to state
requirements that make use of the new technology.
2) The environment - The highly competitive environment
for government funds forces marketing of programs in order to
obtain and hold on to funds. When a program finally receives
budget approval, the environment has frequently forced
programs to overstate requirements and understate costs.
3) Source Selection - The environment in which program
competition takes place forces bidders to comply and make
improvements within program specifications, not to develop
modifications that deviate from these specifications. This
results in less emphasis on performance and more on optimizing
costs. Frequently the bid goes to the contractor with the
most optimistic bid. Optimistic bids result in understated
costs or underbidding. The underbidding contractor will try
to recover by negotiating performance tradeoffs or submitting
engineering change orders
.
4) PM priorities - Instead of managing the program, the
PM spends a great deal of time answering to an army of special
interest advocates. Each of these advocates can demand that
the program manager take or refrain from taking some action,
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but none of them has any responsibility for the ultimate cost,
schedule, or performance of the program. These special
interests include DoD agencies, contractors, Congress, and a
host of special interest groups. All of these pressures force
the program manager to spend most of his time briefing his
program as opposed to managing it . The report states
:
The above problems result in an extremely long
acquisition cycle - typically ten to fifteen years for major
programs. Long acquisition cycles lead to further problems
[Ref . 5: p. 8]
:
- High development costs. The longer it takes to develop
and field a system, the more expensive the process.
- Obsolete technology. By the time the system is
fielded, its technology is possibly obsolete.
- Goldplating. In anticipation of long lead times for
fielding the system, users may be inclined to overstate the
requirements and the threat in order to counter obsolescence.
None of the above problems directly point to the
acquisition workforce and the need to improve the quality of
the acquisition workforce. They point to factors external to
the workforce - the process, user, PM demands, etc. To
determine the link with the workforce, we must look further
into the Packard Commission Report to a study the report
cited. This study was undertaken by the Defense Science Board
(DSB) [Ref. 5: p. 11] . The DSB compared typical DoD
development programs with successful programs from private
industry and discovered six underlying features common to
these successful commercial programs.
One feature was the small, high quality staffs of these
commercial programs.
Generally, commercial program management
staffs are much smaller than in typical defense
programs, but personnel are hand- selected by the
program manager and are of very high quality.
Program staffs spend their time managing the
program, not selling it or defending it. [Ref . 5: p.
12]
The above observation by the DSB resulted in the Packard
Commission's seventh recommendation: Enhance the Quality of
Acquisition Personnel. It states:
DoD must be able to attract and retain the caliber
of people necessary for a quality acquisition program.
Significant improvements should be made in the senior-
level appointment system. The Secretary of Defense
should have increased authority to establish flexible
personnel management policies necessary to improve
defense acquisition. An alternate personnel management
system should be established to include senior
acquisition personnel and contracting officers as well as
scientists and engineers. Federal regulations should
establish business-related education and experience
criteria for civilian contracting personnel, which will
provide a basis for the professionalization of their
career paths. Federal law should permit expanded
opportunities for the education and training of all
civilian acquisition personnel [Ref. 5: p. 27]
.
With this recommendation, the Packard Commission linked
the performance of the acquisition system to management of
acquisition personnel. They determined that progress in the
performance of the acquisition system demands improvement in
the management of acquisition personnel.
The report compared the acquisition workforce with its
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civilian counterparts and concluded, "this work force is
undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced. " [Ref . 5: p. 28]
The report stressed the importance of enhancing the quality of
the defense acquisition work force- -both by attracting
qualified new personnel and by improving the training and
motivation of current personnel.
In summary, the Packard Commission found many problems
with the acquisition process. None of these problems seemed
to directly result from the quality of the acquisition
workforce. However, as a result of the DSB study that
compared the acquisition workforce to its industry
counterparts, the Packard Commission recommended improving the
quality of the acquisition workforce.
2 . Congressional Hearings
The House Armed Services Committee, Investigations
Subcommittee, held hearings regarding the acquisition
workforce on 28 March and 24 April 1990. These hearings
ultimately led to the passing of DAWIA. Witnesses at these
hearings were leaders in DOD acquisition, academia, and
industry. They included current and former Under Secretaries
of Defense, the CEO of Martin-Marietta, the chairman of the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, and
the Commandant of the Defense Systems Management College.
The subcommittee conducted hearings on proposals for
creating a "rationally and logically structured acquisition
workforce which would serve as the foundation for a high
16
quality professionalized acquisition corps of senior
executives." [Ref . 6: p. 1] The chairman of the Investigations
Subcommittee, Hon. Nicholas Mavroules stated:
For many years, now, we have enacted all sorts of
legislation dubbed "Acquisition Reform 1 . We have changed
the process. We have changed the procedures. We have
changed many of the roles. But we have not yet addressed
the most important element in the equation: people.
For the past year-and-a-half , the staff has been
collecting data on the quarter million people who spend
about $14 billion a year in taxpayer money. Here are a
few things we have learned. The fragmented training
system requires 12 courses on contracting, but none for
systems engineering or logistics, although they are key
cost drivers. Less than a third of those assigned as
program managers of major Navy systems have ever attended
a course on program management
.
. . .we need to pay more attention to the people in
the acquisition field. We need to train them better. We
need to pay more attention to their career paths. We
need to prepare them as professionals and then we need to
respect them as professionals
.
[Ref . 6: p. 1]
It was clear from these hearings that the consensus among
committee members and witnesses was that the intent of the
subcommittee proposals was fully supported. Various
approaches were presented and witnesses voiced some concerns
over details of the proposed legislation, but on the whole all
attendees agreed with the proposal to develop and manage a




The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, Public
Law 101-510, Title XII was passed on November 5, 1990. The
law directs the following [Ref. 7: p. 1638]:
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- Revises policies and procedures for the recruitment,
training, and career development of military and civilian
defense acquisition personnel.
- Requires DoD to establish acquisition corps for each
military department and for other defense agencies.
- Directs DoD to establish policies and procedures for
acquisition personnel education and training programs,
including intern, cooperative education, and scholarship
programs
.
- Establishes a defense acquisition university.
- Authorizes special pay for acquisition officers in
certain critical positions, and repayment of student loans to
facilitate recruitment or retention of acquisition personnel.
DAWIA comprises five subchapters. These subchapters are
summarized below.
1. Subchapter I, General Authorities and
Responsibilities
Outlines roles, authorities, and responsibilities for the
Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, the Director of Acquisition Education, Training,
and Career Development, Service Acquisition Executives, and
the Directors of Acquisition Career Management in the military
departments. This subchapter directs the Secretary of each
military department, acting through the service acquisition
executive, to establish an acquisition career program board to
advise the service acquisition executive in managing the
accession, training, education, and career development of
military and civilian personnel in the acquisition workforce
and in selecting individuals for an Acquisition Corps. [Ref . 7:
p. 1638]
2. Subchapter II, Defense Acquisition Positions
Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate those
positions in the Department of Defense that are acquisition
positions. The acquisition positions must include the
following areas [Ref . 7: p. 1640]
:
- Program management
- Systems planning, research, development, engineering,
and testing
- Procurement, including contracting
- Industrial property management
- Logistics
- Quality control and assurance
- Manufacturing and production
- Business, cost estimating, financial management, and
auditing
- Education, training, and career development,
- Construction
- Joint development and production with other government
agencies and foreign countries
Section 1722 directs the Secretary of Defense, acting
through the DAE, to:
...ensure that appropriate career paths for
civilian and military personnel who wish to pursue
careers in acquisition are identified in terms of
the education, training, experience, and
assignments necessary for career progression of
civilians and members of the armed forces to the
most senior acquisition positions. The Secretary
shall make available published information on such
career paths. [Ref. 7: p. 1641]
This section further directs the Secretary to limit
preference for military personnel while taking actions to
ensure that civilians are given maximum opportunity to qualify
for senior acquisition positions through selection of the best
qualified individuals. It also directs the Secretary to
increase the proportion of civilians serving in critical
acquisition positions
.
[Ref . 7: p. 1641]
This law directs the Secretary of Defense to establish
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education, training, and experience requirements for each
acquisition position. Section 1724 specifically outlines
qualification requirements for contracting positions. [Ref . 7:
p. 1642]
3. Subchapter III, Acquisition Corps
Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an
Acquisition Corps for each of the military departments. The
SECDEF must ensure that the officers within the Acquisition
Corps are promoted at the same rate as all line officers.
Selection and eligibility criteria must be established
regarding education and experience. [Ref. 7: p. 1644]
Acquisition Corps qualification criteria are specified in
this subchapter. For example, it requires corps members to
have a baccalaureate degree at an accredited educational
institution and at least 24 semester credit hours (or the
equivalent) of study from an accredited institution of higher
education from among the following disciplines: accounting,
business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics,
industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, and
organization and management or 24 semester credit hours (or
the equivalent) from an accredited institution of higher
education in the person's career field and 12 semester credit
hours from such an institution from among the above
disciplines. [Ref. 7: p. 1645]
According to this subchapter, critical acquisition
positions can be filled only by members of the Acquisition
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Corps. The SECDEF must designate the acquisition positions
that are critical acquisition positions. The positions must
include acquisition positions requiring civilian grades of GS-
14 or above, Senior Executive Service, military members in the
grade of 0-5 or above, program executive officer positions,
program managers, and "any other acquisition position of
significant responsibility . . . "[Ref. 7: p. 1643]
Subchapter III also specifies assignment periods for
program managers, stating:
. . .a program manager and a deputy program manager of
a major defense acquisition program must be assigned to
the position at least until completion of the major
milestone that occurs closest in time to the date on
which the person has served in the position for four
years . . . [Ref. 7: p. 1647]
Subchapter III further specifies experience and education
requirements for program managers, deputy program managers,
program executive officers, general officers and civilian
equivalent positions, and senior contracting officials. For
example, prior to being assigned to a program manager
position, a person must have completed the program management
course at Defense Systems Management College or comparable
program (with SECDEF approval), and, for major programs, have
at least eight years of experience in acquisition, at least
two years of which were performed in a program office or
similar organization. [Ref . 7: p. 1649]
4 . Subchapter IV, Education and Training
Directs the SECDEF to establish policies and procedures
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for establishing and implementing education and training
programs. Programs to be established include intern programs,
cooperative education programs, scholarship programs, and
others such as tuition reimbursement and student loan
repayment. The SECDEF is also required to establish and
maintain a defense acquisition university structure to educate
the acquisition workforce and provide research and analysis of
defense acquisition policy issues from an academic
perspective
.
[Ref . 7: p. 1651]
5 . Subchapter V, General Management Provisions
Prescribes general management requirements and
authorities. The chapter specifically directs the military
departments and Defense Agencies to establish a management
information system capable of providing standardized
information to the Secretary on persons serving in acquisition
positions. [Ref . 7: p. 1653]
With the passing of DAWIA, we have a law that prescribes
the management policies for the acquisition workforce. This
law outlines qualification requirements, assignment policies,
career progression, and overall policies and structure for
managing the acquisition workforce.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Throughout U.S. history, the Defense acquisition process
has been subjected to a great deal of reform efforts, largely
as a result of negative perceptions about its efficiency as an
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acquisition system. These perceptions emanate from executive
administrations, Congress, and the public. Numerous
acquisition reform initiatives have tried to alleviate these
perceptions. These reform initiatives have historically been
cyclical and are largely implemented without provisions
requiring the measurement of their intended effect on the
acquisition process.
DAWIA is an example of such a reform initiative. DAWIA's
objectives are primarily to improve the quality of the
acquisition workforce and to improve the acquisition process.
How do we determine whether these objectives are being
achieved? Metrics could be the answer. The next chapter





This chapter introduces metrics, providing definition,
purpose, and benefits. The chapter describes a methodology
for establishing metrics in an organization. The chapter
then presents metrics used in other fields (e.g. software,
education) and presents metrics proposed within DoD for
acquisition reform.
B. METRICS DEFINED
In most technical endeavors, measurement and metrics help
us to understand the technical process that is used to develop
a product. The process is measured in an effort to improve
it. [Ref . 8: p. 43]
At first, it would appear that using measurement in
processes is a highly desirable tool. After all, measurement
enables us to quantify and therefore manage more effectively.
But reality can be somewhat different. Choosing the
appropriate measures can be quite difficult and the choice can
invite a lot of argument and controversy. What are
appropriate metrics for the process? Is it fair to use
measurements to compare people, processes, or products? These
questions and dozens of others always surface when an attempt
is made to measure something that has not been measured in the
past. [Ref. 8 : p. 43]
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Lord Kelvin once said:
When you can measure what you are speaking
about and express it in numbers, you know something
about it; but when you cannot measure, when you
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of
a meager and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in
your thoughts, advanced to the stage of a
science. [Ref . 8: p. 45]
C. MEASURING IN ORGANIZATIONS
An organization is a system with three levels of
performance- -organization, process, and job/performer- -that
must be managed in order to get consistent, high-level
organization output. We measure within an organization so
that we can monitor, control, and improve system performance
at all three levels. We measure in order to [Ref. 9: p. 141] :
- Specifically communicate performance expectations to
subordinates
- Know what is going on in the organization
- Identify performance gaps that should be analyzed and
eliminated
- Provide feedback that compares performance to a
standard
- Identify performance that should be rewarded
- Effectively make and support decisions regarding
resources, plans, policies, schedules, and structure
- Identify areas for improvement
Another metrics perspective was presented by the Process
Action Team (PAT) for contract administration reform in
February 1995. The PAT identifies metrics that simply record
whether an event has happened or not (go/no-go metrics)
,
metrics that determine the extent to which an action is taking
place (activity metrics) , and metrics that measure whether
actions are achieving the desired results. [Ref. 10: p. 37]
Effective use of measures means not only establishing
measures, but using them properly. Measures must be used to
monitor the things in an organization that are linked to
organization goals and objectives. The measurement system, in
its totality, should contain related measures that are not
counterproductive. Finally, the measurement data must be
collected and used for the benefit of the organization through
intelligent action. [Ref. 9: p. 142]
Rummler and Brache, in "Improving Performance" developed
the following sequence for establishing measures in an
organization [Ref. 9: p. 143] :
1
.
Identify the most significant outputs of the
organization, process, or job.
2. Identify the "critical dimensions" of performance for
each of these outputs. Critical dimensions of quality include
accuracy, ease of use, novelty, reliability, ease of repair,
and appearance. Critical dimensions should be derived from
the needs of the internal and external customers who receive
the outputs and from the financial needs of the business.
3. Develop the measures for each critical dimension.
For example, if "ease of use" is a critical dimension of
quality for a given output, one or more measures should answer
this question: "What indicators will tell us if our customer
finds our product or service (output) easy to use?"
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D. MEASURING IN VARIOUS FIELDS
Metrics exist in many fields, and each field approaches
the use of metrics in a unique way. The fields presented are
software development and training/education. These fields
were chosen because their products are difficult to measure
and thus present similar metrics challenges to those facing
acquisition reform and DAWIA. Each field has attempted to
face the challenge of developing metrics that accurately and
effectively measure what is actually intended to be measured.
1. Software
Software metrics refer to a broad range of measures for
computer software. The primary focus of these measures is
with productivity and quality- -measures of output and fitness
of use. The software community is interested in these types
of metrics for planning and estimation purposes. They want to
be able to determine productivity and quality on past projects
and determine how the productivity and quality data can be
extrapolated to the present
.
[Ref . 8: p. 45]
We measure software for many reasons: (1) to indicate the
quality of the product; (2) to assess the productivity of the
people who produce the product; (3) to assess the benefits
derived from new methods and tools; (4) to form a baseline for
estimation; (5) to help justify requests for new tools or
additional training. [Ref . 8: p. 45]
The software community categorizes metrics in two ways:
direct and indirect measures. Direct measures are often
physical, tangible measurements of a process or product such
as cost, speed, size, and number of defects. Indirect
measures, less straightforward measurements, include
functionality, quality, complexity, efficiency, reliability,
maintainability, and many other "abilities ." [Ref . 8: p. 46]
Software metrics have been further categorized into the
following: Productivity metrics focus on output, quality
metrics provide an indication of conformance to a standard,
technical metrics focus on the degree of complexity of a
process or product, size-oriented metrics are used for direct
measures, function-oriented metrics provide indirect measures,
and human-oriented metrics collect information about the
manner in which people develop products and the human
perception about the effectiveness of tools and methods. [Ref.
8. p. 46]
2 . Training and Education
Many organizations expend a great deal of resources on
training and education programs for its employees, and the
government is certainly no exception. These organizations
assume or hope that these programs provide benefit to the
organization with the ultimate objective of improving the
performance of the organization.
Should the benefits of the training and education be
based on assumptions and hope or should actions be taken to
measure the effectiveness of the training and education? Most
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organizations would prefer the latter for two reasons: 1) to
justify the expenditure of resources on training and
education; and 2) to improve the training and education
programs in order to better meet the needs of the
organization. This section explores ways to measure the
effectiveness of training and education.
The key to measuring the effectiveness of training and
education is to begin with the overall organization
objectives. After overall organization objectives have been
identified, the following steps should be taken [Ref. 11: p.
180] :
1) Identify employee performance behaviors that enable
the organization to accomplish organization objectives.
2) Establish training to develop those performance
behaviors
.
3) Measure the resulting performance behavior against the
desired performance behavior to determine the effect of the
training.
4) Measure improvement in organization performance.
A training program should ultimately exist to change an
old behavior to a new behavior. This new behavior should have
some type of effect on the organization. If the new behavior
is a desired behavior linked to organizational objectives,
then the effect should be positive. [Ref. 11: p. 181]
However, linking training to organizational performance
is likely to be very difficult. Organizational performance
improvements could result from many factors other than from
training unless there is certainty that no other factors
exist. Factors could include other areas such as process
improvements, better products, organizational changes, etc.
Therefore, a more effective evaluation of training programs
would be limited to steps 1, 2, and 3 above. Odiorne states:
If a course defines its intentions as changing
specific old behavior to specific new behavior and
this change actually occurs, the training must be
considered successful. The evaluation of training
is limited to assessing or measuring as accurately
as possible how much of the desired (objective)
behavior was actually attained and applied: first,
in the class, and second, back on the job.
If training actually changed behavior in the
class then it must be considered a training success
from the class standpoint and instruction technique
standpoint. If it fails to convert back to the
job, then the analysis of system support of that
behavior may be at fault and not the training, but
the prior planning and task analysis are probably
at fault. [Ref . 11: p. 182]
Training and education programs consume a great deal of
organization resources- -time, people, and money- -resources
that could be used elsewhere to benefit the organization.
Cost effectiveness studies aim to determine the benefit
received from training and education programs compared to the
resource cost for these programs
.
[Ref . 11: p. 183]
Cost effectiveness studies of training require that
objectives for training be set and that these objectives have
the following characteristics [Ref. 11: p. 190]:
1) They define the behavior change sought, stating what
the present behavior is and its consequences and the desired
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behavior and its consequences.
2) These must be stated in mixtures of words and numbers,
which calls for quantifying certain key parts of the
behavioral objectives in order that they might be used later
as criteria for measuring contribution of the training effort.
However, measuring the effect of training and education
can be quite difficult. Many aspects of human behavior do not
lend themselves to quantification. The reliability of
measures varies. Odiornes identifies the following measures
in descending order of reliability [Ref . 11: p. 191]
:
1) Hard, raw, real time data comprise the best kind of
measurement. Dollars of expense cut, reduced performance
time, and quantity of items produced are examples. This type
of data is objective and can be easily verified.
Unfortunately, it can be very difficult to directly tie this
type of data to training.
2) Indices and percentages are used to denote change,
including changed behavior. This measurement tool is less
reliable than hard data, but nonetheless can be quite
valuable. Batting coaches will watch the change in their
students' batting average, slugging percentage, and runs
batted in percentage to evaluate the effect of their teaching.
3) Position on a scale is a third type of measurement
device where subjects use ratings to make assessments. On a
scale of one to five, a supervisor may be asked to rate his
employee's performance prior to training and after training.
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4) Verbal descriptions, the least reliable and most
subjective, are used when no other measure is possible.
Training evaluations frequently rely on student opinions.
Surveys are gathered at the completion of the class or at the
completion of each individual session. These surveys provide
an assessment on the quality of instruction but provide no
input on how the instruction impacts work performance. [Ref
.
11: p. 192]
Opinions on training can also be obtained from third
parties such as employee supervisors. Supervisors could get
information from students about the class, either directly or
indirectly, and make an assessment. This approach can be very
disorganized, subjective, and as a result, unreliable . [Ref
11: p. 193]
Opinions on training can be gathered from the trainer or
training administrator. If the training is pleasing to these
people, it may be considered successful. Clearly this
approach can result in misleading assessments when the needs
of the trainer or administrator take precedence over the needs
of the student
.
[Ref . 11: p. 193]
There are additional, but less reliable ways to evaluate
training and education programs. Participation measures are
used to measure participation in terms of the number or
percentage of personnel enrolled or the percentage of
successful completions. If this type of evaluation equates
enrollment or completion with success then the evaluation
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fails. Participation is no indication of the success of a
program. Comparison measures are used to compare training
programs to training programs within similar organizations or
compare to a standard quality program. This type of
evaluation could lead to unfortunate conclusions because no
two organizations are exactly alike and a standard quality
program is based upon someone's subjective determination of
what a quality program should be. [Ref . 12: p. 20]
There are many ways to measure and evaluate the success
of training and education programs. Measures and evaluation
based upon measurable criteria that relate to organization
objectives are the most feasible and fruitful [Ref. 12: p.
21] .
E. ACQUISITION REFORM METRICS
The focus on acquisition reform (AR) in recent years has
resulted in increased efforts within DoD to develop metrics
for assessing the efficiency gains within DoD acquisition.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development,
and Acquisition, Mr. Gilbert Decker, stated the following as
one of his goals in his Acquisition Reform Strategic Plan for
all Army acquisition organizations [Ref. 13]
:
Put metrics in place to measure progress.
Elaborate reporting and feedback systems are
counterproductive, but a few key, value-added
metrics are necessary to focus efforts and
determine progress. AR metrics should be developed
to support the command strategy, be directly
related to measurement of outcomes, and measure
progress in the following high payoff areas:
1) Use metrics to measure the rapidity of
technology insertion into fielded systems.
2) Measure increased use of performance
specifications
3) Measure the reduction in acquisition cycle
and procurement lead-times.
4) Measure total cost reductions.
1. DoD Acquisition Reform Metrics
DoD established the Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group
(ARBG) in 1996 to develop metrics for assessing the efficiency
gains within DoD acquisition. These metrics are in the early
stages of development. The ARBG states "... data presented
for each metric is subject to refinement as the metrics are
evaluated. Furthermore, metrics may be further developed or
discarded in the future if deemed appropriate by the
ARBG."[Ref. 14]
The ARBG has developed three levels of metrics;
enterprise, subordinate, and program metrics [Ref. 15].
Enterprise metrics are used to assess efficiency gains of the
total acquisition process. These metrics are further broken
down into cost metrics, schedule metrics, training metrics,
and performance metrics . Subordinate metrics are the next
level of metrics. These metrics measure the subordinate tasks
or elements that contribute to enterprise metrics. Program
metrics are the lowest level metrics developed by the ARBG.
These metrics measure factors relative to specific acquisition
programs
.
Following are descriptions and diagrams of enterprise,
subordinate, and program metrics:
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a. Enterprise Metrics
(1) ' Annual Rate Change. A cost metric
intended to capture enhanced acquisition process control due
to the implementation of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) (Figure 1) . The use of
IPTs and CAIV is expected to diminish the historic fluctuation
in program cost growth. This metric is calculated using
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data from common DoD major
defense acquisition programs across sequential years. [Ref. 16]
















Figure 1. From Ref. [16]
(2) Purchasing Cost. A cost metric that
presents the in-house costs incurred to purchase one dollar of
goods and services, as a measure of in-house _ef ficiencies
(Figure 2) . Simplified acquisition procedures and procurement
process improvements are expected to decrease purchasing costs
over time. The metric uses personnel data translated into
purchasing cost by using salary and fringe benefits data from
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the Service personnel offices, OSD, and DoD agencies. The
purchasing dollar value is calculated based on procurement
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Figured From Ref. [17]
(3) Cycle Time. A schedule metric that
measures DoD progress in streamlining acquisition decision
processes and procedures to reduce the amount of time between
milestones from the concept definition through production and
deployment of a weapon and/or information system for major
defense acquisition programs (MDAP) (Figure 3)
.
[Ref. 18]
(4) On Time Delivery. A schedule metric
intended to capture the effects of IPTs and enhanced selection
processes (such as past performance) (Figure 4) . The metric
presents the percent of contract line items which are on
schedule in accordance with their contract terms. Data
includes line items from major weapons systems to consumables,
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Figure 3. From Ref. [18]
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Figure 4. From Ref. [19]
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(5) Workforce Development. A training metric
that presents DoD's progress 'in continuing to develop the
acquisition workforce through training (Figure 5) . The metric
measures the percentage of certified personnel across the























Figure 5. From Ref. [20]
(6) Quality. A performance metric intended to
capture the effect of numerous DoD initiatives (MIL-STD
reform, regulatory reform, IPTs) on the product and process
quality of items procured by DoD, including quality of design,
development and manufacture (Figure 6) . [Ref. 21]
(7) MDAP Breach. A performance metric that
captures efficiency gains due to IPTs associated with program
breaches and resolution of those breaches (Figure 7) . Over
time, both the number of breaches and time to resolve them are
expected to decline. The metric identifies the total number
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of acquisition program baselines (APBs) as compared to the
number of breaches resolved (cost, schedule, and performance)
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Figure 7. From Ref. [22]
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Jb. Subordinate Metrics
(1) Cost Premiums. This metric is the
observed regulatory cost premium paid for unique government
requirements as estimated by DCAA based upon the 10
Reinvention Laboratories (Figure 8) . The cost premium metric
is a measurement of the acquisition reform cost avoidance and
saving that can be achieved from joint contractor/government
efforts to eliminate non-value added regulations. [Ref . 23]
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Figure 8. From Ref. [23]
(2) Consumable Item Price Index. A metric
intended. to capture the cost avoidances that can be achieved
by adopting world class business processes for consumable
items (Figure 9) . The metric is a comparison of the Fisher
Ideal Market Basket Index (five major DLS commodities) with
the overall Defense Logistics Agency index of budgeted product
costs for a sampling of more than 100,000 items . [Ref . 24]
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(3) Conversion Price. Measures the cost
avoidances associated with acquiring products and parts from
reliable suppliers based upon performance (versus "how to")
specifications (Figure 10) . This metric represents the
estimated cost avoidance from converting from military to
commercial specifications on selected commodity purchases made
by the Defense Logistics Agency. [Ref. 25]














FV93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FYS8
Figure 9. From Ref. [24]
(4) Commercial Content. An indicator of the
degree of commercial material purchased by DoD (Figure 11)
.
This metric indicates the dollar value of commercial items
compared to total dollar value of all obligations for
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Figure 11. From Ref. [26]
(5) FACNET Transactions. Presents the number
of FACNET transactions for all DoD organizations (Figure 12)
.
This metric is a measure of the implementation of commercial
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Figure 12. From Ref. [27]
(6) Multi-Year Procurement. Presents the
total number and dollar value of initial multi-year
procurements (Figure 13) . It is an indicator of the extent of
the government's long term supplier relationships. [Ref. 28]
Dollar Value of Initial Multi-Year Contracts
1993 1994 1995 1996
Billions of Dollars
Figure 13. From Ref. [28]
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(7) Administrative Lead Time (ALT) . A metric
that presents the average time elapsed 'from the initial
identification of a need to the contract award (Figure 14)
.
Improved efficiencies associated with acquisition streamlining
and simplified acquisition procedures are expected to reduce
ALT. At this time, the metric presents the average lead times
for consumables and reparables (secondary items) across

























Figure 14. From Ref. [29]
(8) Contract Changes. This metric presents
the number of Class 1 Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) and
major waivers /deviations for all DCMC administered contracts
(Figure 15) . This metric is an indicator of improved
design/development processes ' based on streamlined business
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Figure 15. From Ref. [30]
(9) Contract Protests. This metric presents
the number of DoD contractor protests of awards and the number
of protests that were ruled in favor of the contractor (Figure
16) . This metric is expected to decline with the
implementation of solicitation and procurement process
reform. [Ref. 31]
(10) Commercial Item Contract. An indicator
of the extent of commercial item acquisition within DoD
procurement (Figure 17) . This metric is the ratio of contract
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Figure 17. FromRef.[33]
(11) Cost and Pricing Data. An indicator of
reduction in unique government requests for pricing data and
its associated proposal preparation cost, government and
contractor oversight, " and restriction of the commercial
contracting base (Figure 18) . This metric presents the
percent of actions requesting Cost and Pricing data for
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actions over $500,000 and for actions under $500, 000 . [Ref . 33]
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Figure 18. From Ref. [33]
(12) Acquisition Phase Time. This metric
measures DoD progress in streamlining acquisition decision
processes and procedures to reduce the amount of time between
milestones from the concept definition through production and




(13) Logistic Response Time. An indicator of
DoD ' s effort to move toward world class logistics practices,
including simplified acquisition procedures for logistics
items such as spares and consumables (Figure 20) . This metric
presents the average elapsed time between customer order and















Figure 20. From Ref. [3 5]
c. Program Metrics
(1) Military Specifications (MILSPECs) .
Presents percentage reduction of the number of MILSPECs and




[Ref . 36: p. 1]
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
C-130J CDE FSCATT JDAM JPATS NDAA
Figure 21 From Ref. [36]
(2) Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL)
.
Presents percentage reduction of the number of CDRLs in an RFP
as compared to a traditional program (Figure 22) . [Ref. 36: p.
2]
(3) Contract Administration Work Hours. A
metric presenting the percentage reduction of Contract
Administration Services (CAS) work hours for programs using
acquisition reform as compared to traditional programs prior
to reform (Figure 23). [Ref. 36: p. 3]
(4) Proposal Preparation. Percentage
reduction in Request For Proposal (RFP) preparation work hours
as compared to a traditional program (Figure 24). [Ref.36:p. 4]
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Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
C-130J CDE FSCATT JOAM JPATS HDAA
Figure 22. From Ref. [36]
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
FSCATT JDAM JPATS CDE C-130J
Figure 23. From Ref. [3 6]
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90%
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
C-130J CDE FSCATT JDAM JPATS
Figure 24. From Ref.[36]
(5) DCAA Audit Hours. Percentage reduction in
DCAA audit hours as compared to a traditional program (Figure
25)
.
[Ref . 36: p. 5]
(6) Proposal Evaluation Time. Percentage
reduction in proposal evaluation hours as compared to a
traditional program (Figure 26) . [Ref. 36: p. 6]
(7) RFP Pages. Percentage reduction in the
number of RFP pages as compared to a traditional program
(Figure 27). [Ref. 36: p. 7]
(8) Contract Costs. Percentage reduction in
contract costs (estimate vs. award) as compared to a
traditional program (Figure 28)
.
[Ref. 36: p. 8]
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
FSCATT JDAM JPATS C-130J
Figure 25. From Ref. [3 6]
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
C-130J CDE FSCATT JDAM
Figure 26. From Ref. [3 6]
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(9) Program Office Staffing. Percentage
reduction in program office staffing as compared to a
traditional program (Figure 29).[Ref. 36: p. 9]
(10) Contract Cost Variance. Percentage
reduction in contract cost variance as compared to a
traditional program (Figure 30).[Ref. 36: p. 10]
Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
C-130J CDE FSCATT JDAM JPATS HDAA
Figure 27. From Ref.[36]
(11) Contract Schedule Variance. Percentage
reduction in the contract schedule variance as compared to a
traditional program (Figure 31)
.
[Ref . 36: p. 11]
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Percentage Reduction - Compared to a Traditional Program
FSCATT JOAM JPATS CDE C-130J
Figure 28. From Ref. [3 6]
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Figure 31. From Ref.[36]
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2 . Navy Acquisition Reform Metrics
The Department of the Navy is working to develop metrics
to gauge the implementation of Acquisition Reform Initiatives.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) memorandum, "Navy Acquisition Metrics -
Progress Reviews," requires monthly status reviews commencing
27/28 June 1996 ". . . as a means to gauge and report
progress in achieving acquisition reform strategic
goals." [Ref. 37] The suggested metrics are the following
[Ref . 38]
:
- Average Cycle Time for Issuance of RFPs
- Use of IPTs
- RFP (ACAT 1-3) Specifications/Standards Waivers
- Use of FAR Part 12 for Commercial Item Acquisitions
- Number of RFPs Allowing Oral Presentations
- Number of Electronic Solicitations
- RFPs Using CAIV
- RFPs Considering Total Ownership Cost
- ACAT 1-4 RFPs Using Strategies to Minimize
People/Training Time Needed to Operate Systems
- Electronic Data Deliverables
- EDI Usage
- Configuration Management Delegated to Contractor
- Use of Award Fees
- IPTs with Multiple-site Participation
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Metrics can be a valuable tool for gauging
implementation, effectiveness, and success within an
organization. There are many types of metrics, therefore, in
order to be effective and relevant, metrics must be tailored
to the needs of the organization.
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Acquisition reform metrics are in the early stages of
development . Most of the ARBG metrics focus on the
acquisition process, gauging the improvement in cost,
schedule, and performance. The Navy metrics are geared toward
measuring the implementation of various initiatives. In the
next chapter, we take a closer look at DAWIA and, by using the
information in this chapter, develop metrics for DAWIA.
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IV. ANALYSIS FOR DAWIA METRICS
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an analysis of DAWIA metrics using
the Policy Effectiveness Model (Figure 32) . This model is a
tool used to analyze and develop metrics for programs, and
through its application one can identify the objectives of
DAWIA, identify the activities for accomplishing the
objectives, and propose metrics for measuring the activities.
Policy Effectiveness Model
Figure 32. From Ref.[l]
B. DAWIA OBJECTIVES
The Packard Commission Report, the Congressional hearings
on the acquisition workforce, and the requirements of DAWIA
points to the following objectives for this detailed, far
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reaching legislation:
- Provide a clear career track for the acquisition
workforce
- Educate the workforce
- Increase the number of civilian acquisition positions
- Provide career growth
- Grow PMs
- Stabilize programs through reduction in PM turnover
The aim of the above objectives is to achieve the
following ultimate objectives:
- Increase acquisition expertise and experience
- Control program costs
- Efficiently acquire parts, supplies, materials, and
programs
The first seven objectives focus on improving the quality
of the workforce. The last two objectives focus on improving
the acquisition process. DAWIA aims to produce a quality
workforce that results in an improved acquisition process.
Now we must determine ways to measure these objectives.
C. ACTIVITIES AND METRICS FOR DAWIA OBJECTIVES
The following subsections are DAWIA objectives, as
identified above. Within each subsection are the activities
for accomplishing the objective and proposed metrics for
measuring each activity.
1. Provide a Clear Career Track for the Acquisition
Workforce
a) Activity: Identify acquisition workforce positions and
define a career path that provides development opportunities
and progression.
Metrics: To measure this activity, use a go/no-go metric
that determines whether acquisition positions have been
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designated. Use another go/no-go metric to determine whether
the positions are organized and show career progression. We
can measure by surveying acquisition workforce opinions on
their satisfaction with the career track established for their
career field.
b) Activity: Identify qualification requirements for
acquisition workforce positions.
Metrics : Measure by determining the percentage of
workforce positions that have specified qualification
requirements. Also measure by determining the percentage of
workforce members occupying acquisition positions that meet
the position's qualification requirements.
c) Activity: Establish developmental opportunities (i.e.
developmental jobs, training, and education)
.
Metrics: Use a go/no-go metric to determine whether
developmental opportunities have been identified. Another
metric presents the ratio of the number of acquisition
workforce members to the number of acquisition developmental
slots. An additional metric could be used to measure the
progression of workforce members following developmental
assignments. For example, we could measure the average pay
increase or grade increase for workforce members who completed
developmental assignments and compare figures to those who
haven't completed developmental assignments.
d) Activity: Centrally manage acquisition positions and
training opportunities.
61
Metrics: Use a go/no-go metric to determine whether an
organization has been established to centrally manage
acquisition positions. A metric could measure the percentage
of positions that have been filled through centralized
selection. Use a go/no-go metric to determine whether an
adequate centralized information system has been established
to enhance the military departments" ability to centrally
manage the acquisition workforce.
e) Activity: Effectively communicate the career track
information to the workforce.
Metrics : Measure by surveying a sample of the workforce
regarding knowledge of their career path, qualification
requirements, and developmental opportunities. A resulting
metric could present the percentage of acquisition workforce
members that possess adequate knowledge of their career path.
2 . Educate the Workforce
a) Activity: Establish training and education
opportunities
.
Metrics: Measure the number of acquisition related
training and education opportunities available to the
acquisition workforce. Compare this number to pre-DAWIA
levels if the data is available. Another metric presents the
amount (measured in hours, classes, degrees, etc.) of
education and training acquisition workforce members have
received before DAWIA and after DAWIA. A metric proposed by
the ARBG in the previous chapter (Fig. 5) measures workforce
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quality by presenting the percentage of acquisition certified
personnel
.
b) Activity: Conduct an intern program to provide
individuals opportunities for accelerated promotions, career
broadening assignments, and specified training to prepare them
for entry into the Acquisition Corps. [Ref . 7: p. 1651]
Metrics : Measure the percentage of workforce members that
enter and complete intern programs. Compare these figures to
pre-DAWIA figures (if available) . Measure career progression
of individuals following completion of intern programs by
measuring the average pay increase, grade increase, or job
advancement and compare to pre-DAWIA figures (if available)
.
c) Activity: Conduct a cooperative education credit
program in which accredited institutions of higher education
grant undergraduate credit to workforce members for work
performed in acquisition positions. [Ref. 7: p. 1652]
Metrics: Measure the number of educational institutions
participating in the cooperative program and compare to pre-
DAWIA. Measure the percentage of workforce members
participating in cooperative programs and compare to pre-
DAWIA.
d) Activity: Establish a scholarship program for the
purpose of qualifying personnel for acquisition
positions. [Ref . 7: p. 1651]
Metrics: Use a go/no-go metric to determine whether a
scholarship program has been established. Measure the
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percentage of acquisition personnel participating in the
program. Measure the career progression of personnel that
complete the program.
e) Activity: Provide tuition reimbursement and student
loan repayment for acquisition personnel. [Ref . 7: p. 1653]
Metrics: Measure the percentage of acquisition personnel
that receive these forms of payment. Compare to the pre-DAWIA
percentage (if available) .
3. Increase the Number of Senior Level Civilian
Acquisition Positions
a) Activity: Increase the number of senior level civilian
acquisition positions.
Metrics: Measure the percentage of senior level positions
civilians are eligible to occupy. Compare this percentage to
the pre-DAWIA percentage. Also measure the actual civilian
occupancy of those positions and compare to pre-DAWIA.
b) Activity: Provide civilian leadership and management
training.
Metrics: Measure the quantity of civilian leadership and
management training offered. Measure the percentage of the
civilian acquisition workforce that have attended the
training. Compare these figures to pre-DAWIA figures (if
available)
.
4 . Provide Career Growth
a) Activity: Provide a career growth model.
Metric: Measure career growth of acquisition workforce
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members by tracking promotion rates, pay increases, job
advancement, etc. Compare these numbers to pre-DAWIA figures
(if available)
.
5. Grow Program Managers (PMs)
a) Activity: Establish career paths and
training/education opportunities that lead to PM selection for
acquisition workforce members.
Metrics : Measure the percentage of PMs that began at the
most junior level within the acquisition workforce and compare
to pre-DAWIA percentage. Measure the average amount of PM
acquisition experience, education and training and compare to
the pre-DAWIA average. Measure the promotion rates of
military acquisition members and compare to the promotion
rates of non-acquisition military. Compare results to those
results prior to DAWIA.
b) Activity: Provide opportunities for job variability.
Metrics: To grow PMs, ideally a system would be
established to expose workforce members to various areas of
acquisition (i . e . program management, testing, requirements
development, logistics, etc.). Therefore, we can measure this
activity by tracking variability in job areas and perform
ongoing trend analyses.
6. Stabilize Programs Through Reduction in PM Turnover
a) Activity: Require PMs to remain in position until
completion of the major milestone that occurs closest to the
PM's four year mark.
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Metrics: Measure average time an occupant serves as a PM.
Compare to the pre-DAWIA time. Measure the average number of
PMs for all programs from program conception to fielding of
the system and compare to pre-DAWIA average.
7 . Increase Acquisition Expertise and Experience
a) Activity: All of the previous activities support this
particular objective. We must determine if the above
activities result in increased expertise and experience.
Metrics: Measure expertise through the use of a
standardized test. Link expertise to workforce membership in
professional associations that have qualification requirements
such as exam requirements, experience, etc. Measure the
number of members. However, if professional association
membership is voluntary, this metric can be misleading and
offer little indication of workforce expertise. An
alternative could be establishing a DoD professional
association that requires personnel occupying certain critical
acquisition positions (i.e. Program Managers) to certify
through use of an exam or other criteria.
If we assume a positive relationship exists between
expertise and promotion, measure the promotion rates of the
workforce and compare to pre-DAWIA. To measure experience,
measure the average number of years of acquisition experience
of each workforce member and compare to pre-DAWIA.
8. Control Program Costs
a) Activity: Create a quality workforce through
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training, education, and experience that results in
improvement in program cost control
.
Metric: The objective of any relevant metric would be to
link quality of personnel to program cost control. As a
result, measure the training, education, and experience levels
of personnel who served on programs that controlled costs.
Compare these figures to programs that did not control costs
.
In the comparison look for any trends that relate quality of
personnel (i.e. meets certification requirements) to program
cost control
.
9. Efficiently Acquire Parts, Supplies, Materials, and
Programs
This particular objective is the ultimate objective of
acquisition reform and DAWIA. All of the above DAWIA
objectives and activities are a subset of this objective.
What ' s needed in order to develop activities and metrics for
this objective is to establish a link between DAWIA
(objectives and activities) and improved efficiencies in
acquiring parts, supplies, materials, and programs.
a) Activity: Establish a quality workforce by mandating
training, education, and experience requirements that result
in improved efficiencies when acquiring parts, supplies,
materials, and programs.
Metrics: To measure, we begin with the acquisition reform
metrics identified in the previous chapter (Figures 1-31) to




The next step to establishing metrics for this activity
is to determine what impact a higher quality workforce would
have on an improved efficiency. This can be a challenge since
an improved efficiency could result from many factors other
than or in addition to training and education, as mentioned in
the previous chapter.
However, many of these factors may indirectly involve
training and education. A number of the enterprise metrics,
as defined by the ARBG, attempt to measure improvements
resulting from various initiatives i.e. performance
specifications, IPTs, commercial specifications, etc.
In order for the initiatives to be effective, they must
be properly implemented. Proper implementation often requires
a sufficient amount of training and education. Therefore, a
useful metric could measure the quantity or percentage of the
acquisition workforce that has been trained on a particular
initiative. Additionally, this type of metric could be an
indicator of an initiative's implementation and effectiveness.
This type of metric links training and education to other
reform initiatives.
For example, proponents for the use of IPTs expect to see
improved efficiencies (i.e. reduced acquisition cycle time)
resulting from their use. Obviously, there are many factors
that could determine the success of an IPT. However, one
cannot ignore the importance of training workforce members in
the proper use of IPTs. Thus, we would measure the percentage
of the workforce that has received adequate (adequate would
have to be defined) IPT training. If the training numbers are
low and we see little improvement in efficiencies that result
from IPT use, then there could be a correlation.
If the training numbers are high and there is little
efficiency improvement, reasons could be inadequate training,
inadequate implementation, or ineffective concept. Regardless
of reason, use of this metric could help determine why an
initiative is failing to reach expectations and thus help
leaders direct future efforts.
There could be other effects of a better quality
workforce on the acquisition process that are worth
considering. These effects are usually stated in terms of
organizational benefits and, in some cases, can be translated
into improvements in cost, schedule, and performance.
Some of the benefits identified below can be used
directly as metrics since they are quantifiable. Other
benefits are not quantifiable and in order to be used as
metrics they must be converted into measurable form. This
measurable form can be a rating, of say, 1, most negative, to
10, most positive (the difficulty with using rating metrics is
that you can't go back in time to collect data on these type
of metrics if similar ratings were not used) . Thus the list
of benefits that follow (Table Dean be used as direct metrics
and rating metrics [Ref . 12: p. 5]
:
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Decreases or reductions in Increases or improvements in
Absentee rate Attitude rating towards the
enterprise
Break- in time for new hires Communication skill rating
Customer complaints Leadership rating
Employee errors Customer relation rating
Employee tension rating Customer satisfaction rating
Grievances Employee attitude rating
Labor disputes Employee job satisfaction
rating
Lost time Employee judgement rating
Misfits Employee morale rating
Misinterpretations of policy Employee motivation rating
Operating costs Employee suggestions
Rejects and reworks Employee work habit rating
Requirements for overtime Enterprise flexibility and
adaptability to changing
conditions rating
Sick-leave rates Human relations skills
rating
Tardiness rates Labor relations rating
Time required to introduce
new products or processes
Quality of management and
supervision rating




Violations of rules and
regulations
Work backlog rate
Table 1. After Ref. [12]
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The objectives of DAWIA focus on two major areas --improve
the quality of the workforce and improve the acquisition
process . This study used a methodology for developing metrics
for these objectives. This chapter introduced metrics for
measuring the quality of the workforce and metrics for linking
the quality of the workforce to an improved acquisition
process. These metrics can help to determine how well DAWIA
has been implemented and how effective DAWIA has been towards
improving the quality of the workforce and the acquisition
process. However, there is still a continuing need for
research to analyze and refine metrics for DAWIA.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Various reform initiatives have attempted to improve the
acquisition process. The success or failure of these
initiatives have often been based on subjective
determinations. In order to determine the true effect of
these initiatives, we must be able to use metrics to measure
the implementation and effect of the initiative on the
acquisition process.
DoD, through the establishment of the Acquisition Reform
Baseline Group (ARBG) , has initiated efforts to develop
metrics for measuring the effect of acquisition reform
initiatives. However, only one of the ARBG proposed metrics
relates to DAWIA. This metric, the acquisition workforce
metric, measures the certification percentages of the
acquisition workforce. This metric is primarily linked to
DAWIA' s objective of educating the workforce.
This study identified the specific objectives of DAWIA.
This study used the Policy Effectiveness Model to analyze
DAWIA' s objectives and introduce metrics that can possibly be
used to measure these objectives. Use of these metrics could




Based on the history of acquisition reform, the benefits
of metrics, and the tools available for developing metrics,
this study recommends that metrics continue to be developed
and refined to measure the implementation and effectiveness of
acquisition reform initiatives. Metrics development should
occur prior to implementation of initiative using the
following steps:
1. Determine the initiative's objectives.
2. Determine the activities for accomplishing the
objectives
.
3. Develop metrics for measuring the activities.
4. Implement the initiative.
5. Measure the activities using the metrics.
6
.
Analyze the measurements and make an assessment on
the initiative's implementation and effectiveness.
7 Make changes based on the assessment
.
This study also recommends that the proposed ARBG metrics
be expanded to include DAWIA metrics. Also redefine some of
the ARBG metrics so that they consider the impact of a higher
quality workforce. Improved efficiencies result not only from
initiatives but also from an improved workforce.
Finally, this study recommends that DAWIA metrics be
linked to acquisition reform by establishing metrics to
monitor workforce training on reform initiatives. Effective
implementation of initiatives requires adequate training. In
order to properly assess implementation of a reform initiative
it is necessary to measure workforce training on the
initiative
.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How can DAWIA's effectiveness be measured?
Begin by determining the objectives of DAWIA. Next,
determine the activities that will have to be accomplished in
order to meet those objectives. Finally, develop metrics for
measuring those activities.
2. What are the specific objectives of DAWIA?
The specific objectives of DAWIA are as follows:
- Provide a clear career track for the acquisition
workforce
- Educate the workforce
- Increase the number of civilian acquisition positions
- Provide career growth
- Grow PMs
- Stabilize programs through reduction in PM turnover
The aim of the above objectives is to achieve the
following ultimate objectives:
- Increase acquisition expertise and experience
- Control program costs
- Efficiently acquire parts, supplies, materials, and
programs
3 . What is a metric and what types of metrics are
suitable for acquisition reform?
Metrics are quantifiable measures that allow us measure
people, processes, and products. Suitable metrics for
acquisition reform enable us to measure the implementation and
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effectiveness of acquisition reform initiatives thus allowing
us to assess the initiative's impact on the acquisition
process
.
4 . What metrics are currently being used to measure the
effects of DAWIA on the acquisition process?
Metrics are not being used or proposed to directly
measure DAWIA' s effect on the acquisition process. The only
DAWIA metrics currently proposed measures the effectiveness of
the qualification requirements on the workforce by measuring
workforce certification percentages.
5. Are these appropriate metrics?
This metric is appropriate, but is very limited in its
usefulness. If the only objective of DAWIA was simply to
increase the education levels of the acquisition workforce,
then this metric would completely serve the purpose. However,
DAWIA has other objectives that not only aim to improve the
quality of the workforce but the quality of the acquisition
process. Thus, there is a need to expand DAWIA metrics in
order to measure and assess DAWIA *s impact on the acquisition
process
6. Are there standardized metrics for acquisition
reform initiatives? If not, should standards be established?
The DoD Acquisition Reform Baseline Group has proposed a
set of metrics that appear to be headed towards a standard for
measuring the effects of acquisition reform. These metrics
should be standardized with consideration for adding the
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DAWIA metrics proposed in Chapter IV of this study.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This study is the initial step towards developing
measures of effectiveness for DAWIA and other acquisition
reform initiatives. There is more work to be done. Following
are recommendations for study that will further advance
efforts towards measuring the effectiveness of acquisition
reform:
1. Further refine DAWIA metric design.
2
.
Conduct tests of significance for DAWIA metrics on
the acquisition process.
3 Measure and assess the effectiveness of DAWIA by
applying the metrics developed in this study.
4 Perform similar studies in other areas of
acquisition reform by applying the methodology used in this
study. This should lead to the development of metrics for
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